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In this article Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) is proposed as a potentially
important framework for the understanding and promotion of mental health in athletes.
Cognitive-behavioral approaches predominate in the provision of sport psychology, and
often form the backbone of psychological skills training for performance enhancement
and maintenance. But far from being solely performance-focused, the cognitive-
behavioral approach to sport psychology can restore, promote, and maintain mental
health. This review article presents REBT (Ellis, 1957), the original cognitive behavioral
therapy, as a valuable approach to addressing mental health issues in sport. REBT
holds that it is not events that directly cause emotions and behaviors. Rather, it is one’s
beliefs about the events that lead to emotional and behavioral reactivity. Further, REBT
distinguishes between rational and irrational beliefs, and suggests that in response to
failure, maltreatment, and misfortune, people can react with either healthy or unhealthy
emotional and behavioral responses. The extant research indicates that irrational beliefs
lead to unhealthy negative emotions, a range of pathological conditions, and a host
of maladaptive behaviors that undermine mental health. Therefore, REBT proposes
a process for the reduction of irrational beliefs and the promotion of rational beliefs.
The use of REBT in sport is seldom reported in literature, but research is growing.
This review article proposes three important areas of investigation that will aid the
understanding of irrational beliefs and the application of REBT within sport. These areas
are: (1) the influence of irrational beliefs and REBT on the mental health of athletes, (2)
the influence of irrational beliefs and REBT on athletic performance, (3) the origins and
development of irrational beliefs in athletes. Each area is discussed in turn, offering a
critical and progressive review of the literature as well as highlighting research deficits,
and recommendations to address each of the three areas of investigation.
Keywords: irrational beliefs, rational beliefs, mental health, performance, sport psychology, REBT, emotions,
behaviors
INTRODUCTION
The provision of sport psychology within sporting organizations and with athletes can be
approached in many ways. At present, cognitive-behavioral approaches predominate, where
imagery, self-talk, relaxation, concentration, and goal setting (known as ‘The Canon’) have
been shown to be particularly effective in helping athletes to enhance and maintain athletic
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performance (Andersen, 2009). But far from being solely
performance-focused, the cognitive-behavioral approach to sport
psychology can restore, promote, and maintain mental health.
Indeed, many consider sport psychology to be much more than
the provision of psychological skills training (PST), recognizing
the role sport psychology could play in the mental health
of athletes. Also, many recognize the importance of viewing
athletes as humans first, and athletes second, thus reinforcing
a humanistic approach to helping athletes with self-defeating
emotions and behaviors, inside and outside of their sport. This
is not to say that sport psychologists should ‘treat’ athletes
for mental illness; this is ethically beyond many practitioners’
professional competencies and occupational remit. However,
providing that the practitioner is trained and competent in the
use of counseling approaches, it is possible to work with athletes
on deeply held attitudes and beliefs that positively influence not
only sports performance, but also mental health.
One humanistic cognitive-behavioral approach that is
receiving growing attention in sport literature is Rational
Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1957). REBT is
considered to be the original cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT)
by many scholars, and was developed by Dr. Albert Ellis in the
1950s and was driven in part by Ellis’ desire to conceive of a more
effective psychotherapy that addressed some of the shortcomings
of psychoanalysis (Froggatt, 2005). Inspired primarily by the
Stoic philosophers, REBT holds that it is not events that directly
cause emotions and behaviors. Rather, it is one’s beliefs about the
events that lead to emotional and behavioral reactivity. This is a
common cognitive-behavioral philosophy shared across various
approaches. REBT places this central idea or philosophy into
an ABC framework where the event is represented by the letter
A (activating event or adversity), the beliefs are allocated the
letter B, and finally emotions and behaviors are represented by
C (consequences). Not only does this ABC framework hold up
scientifically when considering the role of cognitive appraisal in
the generation of emotion (David et al., 2002), it also facilitates
therapy, as it is a non-complex and memorable way for clients
to understand the antecedents to their emotions and behaviors.
Most prominently, it enables clients to realize that it is not
outside events (A) that cause their dysfunctional reactions (C), it
is their irrational beliefs (B), and thus, they are in control of how
they respond to adversity because they can have autonomy over
their beliefs.
Theorists and practitioners (e.g., Ellis, 1994; David and
McMahon, 2001) assert that rational and irrational beliefs are
types of ‘hot’ cognition (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958) or
evaluative cognition (David et al., 2005b). Cold cognitions
describe how an individual develops representations of
situations, whereas hot cognitions refer to the evaluation of
cold cognitions, or appraisals (David and McMahon, 2001; David
et al., 2002). Rational and irrational beliefs are also considered
to be ‘deep’ cognitions akin to schemas or core beliefs, which
are difficult to consciously access. Rational and irrational
beliefs, if they are indeed schemas, are complex structures
that represent a person’s constructed concepts of reality, and
behavioral responses to that reality (David et al., 2005b).
Therefore, emotions emerge as a result of cold cognitions that
deem a situation to be motivationally relevant and motivationally
incongruent, mediated by rational and irrational beliefs (hot
cognitions). Put another way, the ability for A (activating event;
cold cognition) to cause C (emotional and behavioral response)
is dependent on B (rational and irrational beliefs; hot cognition).
Hence, the ABC philosophy that informs REBTs theoretical and
therapeutic approach serves to guide treatment and capture the
mechanisms driving emotional responding.
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy distinguishes itself from
other cognitive-behavioral approaches by placing irrational and
rational beliefs at its core. In REBT rational beliefs are defined as
beliefs that are flexible, non-extreme, and logical (i.e., consistent
with reality), and in contrast, irrational beliefs are rigid, extreme,
and illogical (i.e., inconsistent with reality). Specifically, there
are four types of rational and irrational beliefs. Rational beliefs
comprise a primary belief (preferences) and three secondary
beliefs (anti-awfulizing, high frustration tolerance; HFT, and
self/other acceptance). In sport, preference beliefs could reflect
a belief that “I want to be successful but that does not mean I
have to be.” An anti-awfulizing belief could be that “if I do not
succeed it would be bad, but not awful.” An example of HFT is
“failure is difficult, but not unbearable.” A self-acceptance belief
could be “when I fail, it is bad, but does not mean that I am a
complete failure,” whereas other-acceptance could reflect a belief
that “when coaches treat me poorly it is bad, but does not prove
they are bad people.” Irrational beliefs comprise a primary belief
(demandingness) and three secondary beliefs (awfulizing, low
frustration tolerance; LFT, and self/other depreciation). In sport,
demandingness beliefs could reflect a belief that “I want to be
successful and therefore I must.” An awfulizing belief could be
that “if I do not succeed it will be awful” An example of LFT
is “it is unbearable to fail.” A self-depreciation belief could be
“when I fail, it means that I am a complete failure,” whereas other-
depreciation could reflect a belief that “when coaches treat me
poorly, it proves they are bad people.”
In REBT a binary model of distress is proposed whereby
healthy negative emotions (HNEs) associated with adaptive
behaviors stem from rational beliefs, whilst unhealthy negative
emotions (UNEs) associated with maladaptive behaviors stem
from irrational beliefs. UNEs are associated with very unpleasant
physical symptoms (chronic and severe) and usually motivate
behaviors that work against goal attainment. In contrast, HNEs
facilitate goal accomplishment as they are associated with some
unpleasant physical symptoms (acute and mild) and motivate
behaviors that facilitate goal attainment. HNEs and UNEs are
not necessarily distinguished by the intensity of the emotion,
rather, they are qualitatively different. In other words, it is not that
unhealthy anxiety is less intense than healthy anxiety, or that they
are just two versions of the same emotions. It is more accurate to
consider them to be different emotions altogether as they drive
different behaviors (or action tendencies). This binary model of
distress (David et al., 2005a) is in line with research indicating
that negative emotions are not always dysfunctional, and can be
adaptive (e.g., Kashdan and Biswas-Diener, 2014).
Unsurprisingly, the central aim of REBT is to reduce irrational
beliefs in favor of rational beliefs, encouraging decreases in
UNEs and increased in HNEs (Ellis and Dryden, 1997). This
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is done using a systematic disputation (D) process, which
entails the practitioner helping the client to challenge specific
irrational beliefs (Dryden, 2009). The client is asked to consider
whether there is any evidence for their belief, whether it is
logical or consistent with reality, and whether the belief is
pragmatic or helpful. Once the irrational belief has been disputed,
a rational alternate belief is constructed, in line with theory
and in collaboration between client and practitioner, a step
labeled E (effective new belief). Depending on the motivation
of the client, REBT can be completed briefly in as little as five
sessions for clearly defined issues but more long-term REBT is
recommended for more complex issues (Digiuseppe et al., 2014).
However, longer REBT (in terms of minutes) is considered more
effective, having greater impact on treatment outcomes (Lyons
and Woods, 1991; Gonzalez et al., 2004). The precise processes of
using REBT with athletes can be found in the extant literature
(Ellis and Dryden, 1997; Turner and Barker, 2014), but the
efficacy of the ABCDE process, and more broadly REBT, has
been supported in hundreds of research articles (David et al.,
2005b) in both clinical and non-clinical populations, youths and
adults (David and Avellino, 2002), and by three meta-analyses
(Lyons and Woods, 1991; Engels et al., 1993; Gonzalez et al.,
2004). Practitioners wishing to ethically adopt REBT within their
practice should acquire professional competencies by completing
a recognized and official REBT course, and also maintain their
knowledge and skills via peer support groups. Because there is
a paucity of research reporting the use of REBT with athletes,
meta-analyses conducted with non-athletes provides acceptable,
but not strong, justification for the use of REBT with athlete
populations. However, sport literature has started to report the
use of REBT in athlete populations.
REBT AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS IN
SPORT
One of the advantages of practicing and studying sport
psychology is the exposure to a broad range of psychological
approaches, many of which that have their groundings in
cognitive behavioral approaches. As already mentioned, ‘The
Canon’ (Andersen, 2009) comprises cognitive-behavioral
techniques that are effective in helping athletes approach and
manage training and performance situations by helping them
control cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. As an REBT
practitioner it is possible to use The Canon and REBT alongside
one another, with REBT also advocating techniques such as
imagery within its framework. However, the author finds that
REBT is particularly useful for accessing, challenging, and
changing more deeply held beliefs and philosophies than the
techniques included within The Canon. For example, following
REBT, athletes with rational beliefs still get anxious (healthy
anxiety) about competing and The Canon provides useful
strategies for reducing symptoms such as rumination and
debilitative arousal. But some athletes require deeper-level work
in order to counteract core irrational beliefs that drive unhealthy
emotions and behaviors that may be more effectively treated
through REBT.
It is also important to recognize that REBT advocates
a humanistic philosophy that within sport, the author
operationalizes as ‘human first, athlete second.’ REBT is
humanistic and thus focuses on the person, not just the athlete,
and also not just the performance. Therefore REBT is applicable
for a vast range of athlete issues apart from performance
issues, such as career transition, personal life issues, and eating
disorders. The goal of REBT is to enhance and maintain
emotional and behavioral functionality, which then helps to
drive long-term goal achievement. In the context of sport,
where the result is often the most important factor and a quick
fix is tempting, athlete mental health is sometimes forgotten.
It is important to recognize that REBT is also a preventative
approach that can bolster rational beliefs and mental health,
and is not just about providing a solution to irrational beliefs
and mental ill-health. REBT advocates a change in the athlete’s
philosophy of life, so that the individual can face many sport
and life situations with rational beliefs and associated functional
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. This also helps athletes to
self-manage emotions once they have been suitably trained to use
REBT independently and competently. Sport, and many other
performance contexts, can be too reactive to problems, which
can cause sport psychology provision to be seen as remedial,
rather than a core part of athlete support. Nonetheless, the
growth of sport psychology has helped practitioners integrate
well-established and also novel approaches into their practice,
which in the case of REBT is reflected in the recent attention it
has received in sport psychology literature.
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy can be delivered in
time-constricted and access-restricted situations, typical of some
sporting environments. Therefore the modes of delivery typical
in REBT such as group therapy, education, and one-to-one
counseling, fit well within the provision of sport psychology.
Perhaps many sport psychology practitioners use REBT within
their practice, but current literature has sparse examples of REBT
being used with athletes. The writing concerning the use of REBT
in sport has been focused on case-study reflections (e.g., Marlow,
2009) and single-case designs (e.g., Turner and Barker, 2013).
For example, Bernard (1985) provides a very detailed description
of his work applying a rational-emotive training program with
Australian Rules Football players. Delivered in a group setting,
the program included REBT education and also broader themes
such as concentration training and goal setting. Bernard (1985)
reports that the athletes were better able to control their thoughts
to directly influence performance. However, no performance
markers were attained and no control-group was present as this
work was not a research study, deeming the extent to which the
program influenced actual performance impossible to ascertain.
A similar approach was taken by Marlow (2009) who applied
REBT with a youth ten-pin bowler, again within a broad program
of psychological skills, reporting positive performance effects
alongside adaptive behavioral changes.
Away from reflective case-study approaches, there have
been a handful of studies that focus on changes in relevant
dependent variables through the application of REBT. Elko
and Ostrow (1991) applied REBT with six gymnasts and
found reduced anxiety in five and enhanced performance in
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three of the participants. The lack of performance gain in
three of the gymnasts is feasibly attributed to circumstantial
events, but may indicate that the promotion of rational
beliefs does not necessarily improve athletic performance.
In another study, five lecture-based REBT sessions were
provided to youth soft-tennis players, with results indicating
that cognitive-anxiety was significantly reduced (Yamauchi and
Murakoshi, 2001). However, this study is written in Japanese,
has not been translated, and therefore the author has been
unable to discern the precise details of the study. One study
examined the efficacy of REBT for managing trait and state
anxiety direction, and ten-pin bowling performance, compared
to an imagery and relaxation intervention, and a placebo
intervention (Larner et al., 2007). As is typical in REBT, the
intervention focused on changing participants’ interpretations of
competition circumstances, cognitions, behaviors, and feelings
by disputation of underlying beliefs. The relaxation and imagery
intervention comprised rehearsal of alternate physiological and
mental states during competition, and the placebo intervention
emphasized general attention and reflective counseling. The
REBT intervention reduced irrational thinking significantly more
than the comparison interventions, which is to be expected.
However, REBT also significantly moderated negative directional
interpretations of trait and state anxiety symptoms, and
improved performance to a greater extent than the comparison
interventions. Another study focused on the specific irrational
belief of LFT (Si and Lee, 2008) and applied REBT and mental
skills training with an Olympic table tennis athlete. Using coach
and teammate evaluation and video analysis, results showed
a reduction in behaviors related to LFT, and performance
enhancement in competitions.
More recent research has emerged that has adopted single-
case designs to assess the effectiveness of REBT with athletes.
In a study by Turner and Barker (2013), four elite youth
cricketers received three one-to-one REBT counseling sessions
regarding their performance anxiety. Results showed a significant
reduction in irrational beliefs and cognitive anxiety when REBT
was applied, but no objective performance markers were collected
and therefore the impact of REBT on performance was not
evidenced. Two further studies (Turner et al., 2014, 2015) showed
that REBT education sessions were able to significantly reduce
irrational beliefs in elite soccer athletes. However, when REBT
education was applied in a single session, reductions in irrational
beliefs were short-term, returning to baseline levels at a follow-up
timepoint (Turner et al., 2014). Whereas REBT education applied
in three sessions yielded longer-term reductions in irrational
beliefs, lending support to the idea that REBT is not a quick fix.
Again, although in both studies subjectively athletes felt that the
REBT helped them improve emotional control and performance,
no objective markers of performance were sought. More recently
(Cunningham and Turner, 2016), REBT was used with three
semi-professional Mixed Martial Arts athletes on a one-to-one
basis, to reduce irrational beliefs, in particular self-depreciation,
and increase unconditional self-acceptance. Results showed that
two of the three athletes reported decreases in self-depreciation,
and all three showed increases in unconditional self-acceptance
(USA). Also, in a detailed case-study paper REBT was applied
with a country-level archer across seven sessions (Wood et al.,
2016), demonstrating decreases in irrational beliefs, and increases
in rational beliefs, self-efficacy, perceived control, and objective
competitive performance scores.
MOVING THE AREA FORWARD
As is evident in the short review of literature concerning REBT
in sport, the research is scant, thus preventing the formulation
of strong conclusions as to REBT’s efficacy within sport. Further,
the research that exists has focused on the application of REBT
with athletes in the field, and not on testing and validating the
theoretical proponents of REBT in sport settings, or with athletes.
The number of empirical research papers and practitioner
reflections are growing in the sport and REBT literature, but most
articles focus on how the application of REBT reduces irrational
beliefs in athletes, with the use of social validation data to explore
broader changes at an emotional and behavioral level. With the
research in sport in its infancy, there are a number of areas
in which future research should be directed. In this article the
author presents three key areas in which further research should
be invested in order to advance the understanding of irrational
and rational beliefs and REBT in sport.
First, the influence of irrational and rational beliefs and
REBT on the mental health of athletes should be more fully
investigated. Although extant sport research has reported shifts
in irrational and rational beliefs and emotional outcomes (e.g.,
anxiety; Turner and Barker, 2013), research is yet to examine
the effects of irrational beliefs and rational beliefs on broader
mental health outcomes in athletes. Second, given that sport is
a performance-driven industry, the influence of irrational and
rational beliefs and REBT on performance should be more fully
empirically tested. While the extant research provides growing
support for the applicability of REBT for sport performance (e.g.,
Wood et al., 2016), performance outcomes have not robustly been
investigated and therefore the impact of REBT on performance is
currently unknown. Further, the potential mechanisms for sport
performance effects stemming from irrational and rational beliefs
have not been suitably investigated. Third, the development of
irrational beliefs in athletes should be investigated to provide
a clear picture of how and when irrational beliefs emerge in
athletes. This can open the door for early-years development of
rational beliefs in order to avoid mental health issues stemming
from irrational beliefs as the athlete progresses in their career.
This article addresses each of these three areas in detail and in
turn.
The Influence of Irrational Beliefs and
Rational Beliefs on Mental Health
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy did not stem from
performance literature, and like many other cognitive-behavioral
approaches, REBT has been adopted by sport and exercise
psychologists for use in performance settings. The origins of
REBT are within clinical psychotherapeutic settings, where the
chief goal is mental health. Therefore the preponderance of extant
research examines mental health outcomes, and indicates that
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irrational beliefs lead to, and are associated with, a vast range
of emotional and behavioral outcomes that undermine mental
health. In this section of the current article, the author provides
a review of the literature examining irrational beliefs as a risk
factor for mental illness, and rational beliefs as a protective factor
for mental illness. Given the dearth of research investigating
irrational and rational beliefs and the mental health of athletes,
the aim here is to detail the ways in which irrational and rational
beliefs are associated with a broad range mental health issues
that clearly could affect an athlete throughout their careers.
A greater understanding of how irrational and rational beliefs
contribute to mental illness is sought, with a view to proposing
how future research could begin to understand this issue in
sport. Although athletes have not been at the center of this
research, many of the outcomes associated with and stemming
from irrational beliefs could clearly hinder short-term and long-
term athletic achievement, and impact upon the mental health of
athletes. To present REBT as a potentially effective approach to
promoting athlete mental health, it is first important to consider
the wider evidence linking irrational and rational beliefs to
mental health.
General Irrational Beliefs
A vast amount of research has been dedicated to exploring the
associates of irrational beliefs in general, and the associates of
the four core irrational beliefs. Bringing this large literature
base together, it is possible to appreciate the expansive influence
of irrational beliefs on a range of unhealthy emotional and
behavioral outcomes. The theoretical structure of rational and
irrational beliefs within REBT is appealing due to its symmetry
and relative simplicity. But apart from their aesthetic structural
appeal, rational and irrational beliefs are valuable constructs
because they determine numerous cognitive, affective, and
behavioral outcomes, important for mental health. Research has
concentrated more on irrational beliefs than rational beliefs,
perhaps reflecting a problem-focused bias, rather than a benefit-
focused, in the literature concerning REBT. A review by Browne
et al. (2010) highlights many unhealthy associates of irrational
beliefs, such as anger, guilt and shame, and psychopathological
conditions including depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts.
Across the research that demonstrates relationships between
irrational beliefs and dysfunctional emotions, the strength of the
associations varies across studies (e.g., MacInnes, 2004; Bridges
and Harnish, 2010a). Also, associations between increased
irrational beliefs and a consequent increase in emotional or
inferential dysfunction are often small (MacInnes, 2004). In
MacInnes’ (2004) review of the literature he concluded that data
“does not clearly indicate that there is a causal relationship”.
However, it maybe that the hypothesis that irrational beliefs cause
dysfunctional emotions might be true, but that the 18 studies that
met the analysis criteria provide weak evidence.
In a recent meta-analysis (Visla et al., 2016), the relationships
between irrational beliefs and dysfunctional emotions were
examined. Eighty-three studies were included in the analyses,
with a total of 16,110 participants in total across 100 different
samples. The studies published between 1972 and 2014
comprised student (N = 34), clinical (N = 22), and non-
clinical (N = 78) populations. Results revealed significant small
to moderate effect sizes of general distress (r = 0.36), depression
(r = 0.33), anxiety (r = 0.41), anger (r = 0.25), and guilt
(r= 0.29). Interestingly, the association between irrational beliefs
and depression was higher when a stressful event was present
(r = 0.67, p < 0.001) than when not (r = 0.30, p < 0.001).
Also, there was a stronger relationship between irrational beliefs
and general distress when the stressful event was experimentally
induced (r = 0.55, p < 0.001) as opposed to being a real stressor
(r= 0.32, p< 0.001). Overall, the authors comment that the study
evidenced a moderate but robust relationship between irrational
beliefs and psychological distress, corroborating and extending
past research (e.g., MacInnes, 2004).
Many studies show that irrational beliefs are positively
associated with depression and depressive symptoms (e.g.,
Nelson, 1977; Ciarrochi et al., 2005), and that irrational beliefs
are able to distinguish depressed from non-depressed groups
(e.g., Marcotte, 1996; McDermut et al., 1997; Taghavi et al.,
2006). An early study (Nelson, 1977) revealed that the strongest
relationships with depression emerged for irrational beliefs that
reflected a need to excel in all endeavors, that it is terrible when
things are not the way one would like them to be, obsessive worry
about future misfortunes, and the impossibility of overcoming
the influences of past history. These four beliefs are of course
salient in sport, where excellence is desirable, frequent barriers
emerge that can impact success, and athletes are often judged on
previous success (or failure).
The extant literature also indicates that irrational beliefs are
positively related to various forms of anxiety such as trait,
state, speech, social, evaluation, test anxiety in clinical and
non-clinical samples (Himle et al., 1982; Deffenbacher et al.,
1986), and general, phobic, and obsessive compulsives (Thyer
et al., 1983). At a physiological level irrational beliefs have
been associated with greater galvanic skin response (Master and
Gershman, 1983), and systolic blood pressure (Harris et al., 2006),
indicative of greater autonomic physiological arousal. Harris et al.
(2006, p. 5) suggest that “mental rigidity” leads to autonomic
rigidity reflected in systolic blood pressure increases. Examining
more complex physiological parameters, Papageorgiou et al.
(2006) found that irrational beliefs were positively related to
C-reactive protein, interleukin-6, tumor necrosis factor-α, and
white blood cell counts in healthy adults (N = 853), when
controlling for age, sex, years of school, body mass index,
physical activity status, depression levels, and dietary habits.
This study suggests that irrational beliefs maybe a risk factor
for cardiovascular diseases. Indeed, irrational beliefs have been
shown to affect physical health, with irrational beliefs positively
related to eating disorders (Möller and Bothma, 2001) such as
bulimia (Phillips et al., 1997), more severe asthma symptoms
(Silverglade et al., 1994), and a higher frequency of chronic
illnesses (Lichtenberg et al., 1992). Indeed, irrational beliefs
are also positively related to type-A coronary-prone behavior,
where individuals are highly motivated and competitive, but feel
near constant time pressure, and have high hostility and anger
(Friedman, 1977). This has been shown to be a risk factor for
cardiovascular diseases.
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Demandingness
Demandingness in REBT is the primary irrational belief and
research (see Szentagotai and Jones, 2010, for a review)
indicates that demandingness is positively related to a vast
array of dysfunctional emotional and behavioral outcomes.
Specifically, and non-exhaustively, demandingness is associated
with disordered eating (Harrington, 2005a; Pearson and Gleaves,
2006), reduced anger control (Addis and Bernard, 2002),
relationship problems, social avoidance and isolation (Watson
et al., 1998), decreased performance in social situations (e.g.,
speaking; Nicastro et al., 1999), procrastination (Beswick et al.,
1988; Bridges and Roig, 1997), alcohol abuse (Hewitt and Flett,
1991), interpersonal issues (Haring et al., 2003), suicide (Blatt,
1995), and reduced task performance (Frost and Marten, 1990).
It is reasonable to suggest that none of these outcomes are
conducive to short or long-term athletic goal achievement.
Awfulizing
Awfulizing in REBT is a secondary irrational belief and has
been positively related to a submissive interpersonal style
(Goldberg, 1990), social isolation (Watson et al., 1998), unhealthy
anger expression and suppression, and externalized behavioral
disorders (Silverman and DiGiuseppe, 2001). An area highly
relevant to the mental health and performance of athletes is
the research surrounding pain catastrophizing (a term often
used instead of awfulizing), which leads to greater pain (e.g.,
post-knee surgery; Pavlin et al., 2005), more distress, greater
disability, poorer quality of life in response to injury, and is
generally negatively related to all pain outcomes investigated
such as intensity, distress, and functioning, whereas decreased
catastrophizing leads to decreased pain, disability, and depressive
symptoms (see Schnur et al., 2010, for a review). It is thought
that the anxiety provoked by awfulizing increases perceptions of
pain through inflated expectations of high pain, and can lead
to negative mental states activated in anticipation and during
painful experiences (Sullivan et al., 2001). Also, catastrophizing
mediates the relationship between depression and pain such that
higher catastrophizing promotes depressive responses to pain
(Gatchel et al., 1995; Geisser and Roth, 1998). The link between
irrational beliefs and injury outcomes associated with pain is
highly salient to athletes, given that the vast majority (if not all)
of athletes will experience injury during their careers to a greater
or lesser severity and frequency.
Low frustration tolerance (LFT)
Low frustration tolerance is a secondary irrational belief, and
research indicates that it is positively associated with aggressive
expression of anger (Martin and Dahlen, 2004), reduced
anger control (Moller and Van der Merwe, 1997), poor social
adjustment (Watson et al., 1998), addictive behaviors (Ko et al.,
2008), anxiety, depression, procrastination, and dysfunctional
affect (Harrington, 2005b, 2006). The link between LFT and
procrastination has received much research attention, with Ellis
and Knaus (1977, p. 19) regarding LFT as “the main and
the most direct cause of procrastination.” Evidence indicates
that individuals with discomfort intolerance are more likely to
procrastinate on boring, difficult, or demanding tasks (Milgram
et al., 1988), all of which are potential demand characteristics of
athletic training and competition. Individuals that find it difficult
to tolerate difficulty and who experience procrastination are less
likely to fulfill their achievement potential (Wilde, 2012).
Depreciation
Depreciation is a secondary irrational beliefs, and research has
elucidated positive associations with defensiveness to negative
feedback (Chamberlain and Haaga, 2001), aggressiveness (Beck,
1999), unhealthy anger expression (Martin and Dahlen, 2004),
children’s depressive, fear (internalized) aggressive, and anti-
social (externalized) symptoms (Silverman and DiGiuseppe,
2001), and has been associated with those who are easily
threatened by criticism (Ellis and Dryden, 1997). Literature
suggests that depreciation beliefs are a strong predictor of
depression (Solomon et al., 2003), anxiety (David et al., 2002), and
posttraumatic stress responses (Hyland et al., 2014). Depreciation
reflects the notion that on the basis of one occurrence, the
individual generalizes and values the self in line with the result.
For example, an athlete might conclude that because they have
failed in a tennis match, then they are a complete failure. In
REBT it is argued that self-rating in any way is erroneous (Ellis,
1994), because there are no objective bases for arriving at global
evaluations of one’s self (Sava et al., 2011). REBT is unique in that
it encourages the valuation of behaviors, and the unconditional
acceptance of people and the self as a whole.
General Rational Beliefs
Research concerning rational beliefs is less voluminous compared
to research investigating irrational beliefs. Indeed, unlike research
concerning irrational beliefs, the four core rational beliefs have
not been examined to the same extent. This indicates a problem-
orientated focus within the literature, which may reflect a more
general negativity bias (Kanouse and Hanson, 1972), which
refers to the tendency for things of a more negative nature
(e.g., unpleasant thoughts, emotions, or social interactions;
harmful/traumatic events) to have a greater effect on one’s
psychological state and processes than do neutral or positive
things (Lewicka et al., 1992; Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin
and Royzman, 2001). There is no reason to suppose that this
tendency has not permeated the academic research concerning
REBT. This issue notwithstanding, research concerning rational
beliefs (see Caserta et al., 2010) indicates that higher rational
beliefs are associated with greater ability to manage stress of
negative life events (Ziegler and Leslie, 2003; David et al., 2005b),
anxiety (Himle et al., 1982), job stress (Tan, 2004), bereavement
(Boelen et al., 2004), and adjustment (Lee et al., 2004; Ireland
et al., 2005). It has also been found that the use of rational
self-statements during pressured tasks leads to less self-reported
anxiety (Rosin and Nelson, 1983) and emotional distress (Cramer
and Kupshik, 1993) than irrational self-statements, which may
have implications for athletes in terms of how they structure and
frame their self-talk.
Unconditional Self Acceptance (USA)
Unconditional self acceptance is a specific rational belief that
reflects unconditional regard for oneself despite undesirable
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behaviors and adverse events (e.g., rejection, failure). So where
irrational self-depreciation beliefs involve assigning low self-
value and self-worth on the basis of an event, USA involves
accepting oneself regardless of the adversity (Hill et al., 2008).
Davies (2008a) found that USA was most strongly negatively
related to self-depreciation, need for achievement, and need
for approval. Further, participants primed with irrational self-
statements showed reduced USA, and those primed with rational
self-statements showed increased USA (Davies, 2008b). These
studies show that USA is a rational belief that contrasts with
irrational beliefs. USA is negatively related to depression and
anxiety (Chamberlain and Haaga, 2001; Scott, 2007), and low
USA can lead to self-blame and self-criticism (cf. Hill et al., 2008)
and may increase the propensity for narcissism, downward social
comparison (a person looks to another individual or group that
they consider to be worse off than themselves in order to feel
better), and self-centeredness (Neff, 2003).
Research also shows that USA is negatively related to self-
oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed perfectionism
(Flett et al., 2003). Further, Flett et al. (2003) found that
USA mediated the association between socially prescribed
perfectionism and depression, and other-oriented perfectionism
only affected depression through its association with low USA.
This is important because perfectionism has been found to
lead to a range of dysfunctional emotions (Flett et al., 2003),
and similarly in athletes has been associated with psychological
distress, motivational deficits, negative thoughts, anxiety, and
low confidence (see Flett and Hewitt, 2005, for a review).
Furthermore, Flett et al. (2003) found strong links between self-
oriented perfectionism and self-worth beliefs. The authors note
that adolescents with high levels of self-oriented perfectionism
acknowledged that their self-worth is based on how they are
evaluated by themselves and by other people and whether
approval and recognition are forthcoming from others. This is
salient in sport where self and other evaluation is part and parcel
of the context within which athletes are performing. Indeed,
perfectionists often have a contingent sense of self-worth (e.g.,
DiBartolo et al., 2004) often equating making mistakes with
their sense of self-worth (Bernard et al., 2006). It is difficult to
imagine any athlete able to navigate the complex performance
environment without making mistakes or facing set backs that
may impinge on their sense of self-worth.
Critical Summary
The extant research shows that irrational and rational beliefs
are related to a vast array of outcomes relevant to mental
health. Although the research has not considered athletes, clearly
the mental health outcomes can affect athletes within and
outside of their sport participation. Only one study has directly
examined the relationship between irrational beliefs and mental
health outcomes, which revealed that irrational beliefs predicted
increases in physical and emotional exhaustion (a dimension
of burnout) in Gaelic football athletes over an 8-week period
(Turner and Moore, 2015). This finding is inline with past
research outside of sport linking irrational beliefs to greater
burnout (e.g., Balevre et al., 2012). But clearly more longitudinal,
large-scale, studies are required in order to investigate fully
the relationships between irrational beliefs and dysfunctional
responses, especially focusing on athletes. The lack of research
assessing outcomes associated with rational beliefs needs to be
addressed for any meaningful conclusions to be draw as to
the benefits of rational beliefs, as opposed to the benefits of
low irrational beliefs. This is an important distinction because
irrational and rational beliefs are relatively orthogonal, and low
irrational beliefs do not necessarily mean high rational beliefs
(i.e., they do not correlate highly; Ellis et al., 2010). Therefore a
relatively separate and equitable research literature is required for
both irrational beliefs and rational beliefs, which is currently not
present.
Although there is a positive association between irrational
beliefs and clinical and non-clinical mental health outcomes (e.g.,
McLennan, 1987; Prud’homme and Barron, 1992; Macavei, 2005),
past research has been hindered by the way in which irrational
beliefs have been assessed. There are various psychometric
measures of irrational beliefs, many of which have fundamental
limitations (see Bridges and Harnish, 2010b, for a review) thus
casting doubts over the findings from previous research. In
response to a critical review of irrational beliefs assessments
(Terjesen et al., 2009) the development of new measures has
strengthened the assessment of irrational beliefs, with one
inventory specifically developed for use in performance settings
such as sport (irrational performance beliefs inventory, iPBI;
Turner et al., 2016). The iPBI has also shown that higher irrational
beliefs are positively related to trait depression, trait anger, and
trait anxiety.
The Influence of Irrational Beliefs and
REBT on Athletic Performance
As evidenced in the extant research, it is unfavorable to hold
irrational beliefs due to the associated maladaptive emotional
and behavioral consequences that impede mental health. So it
is tempting and indeed reasonable to assume that within a
performance setting such as sport, irrational beliefs would be
deleterious for goal attainment. However, there is little evidence
that irrational beliefs interfere with athletic performance or that
rational beliefs facilitate athletic performance (e.g., Turner, 2014).
In addition, there is little evidence that irrational beliefs lead to
the same emotional and behavioral outcomes in athletes as they
do in non-athletes. It is sensible to hypothesize that irrational
beliefs are as much of an issue in athletes as they are in non-
athletes, as irrational beliefs are evident in almost all societal and
cultural domains (Ellis, 1976), but sport research to date is yet to
determine this.
The research conducted in sport does show that REBT is
an effective intervention for reducing irrational beliefs and
performance anxiety (Elko and Ostrow, 1991; Yamauchi and
Murakoshi, 2001; Larner et al., 2007; Turner and Barker, 2013),
and one case-study demonstrates the improved competitive
performance of an archery athlete (Wood et al., 2016). This
research employs applied research methods offering support
for the use of REBT with athletes via a traditional one-to-
one counseling approach. However, little research has included
objective performance markers to assess the effects of REBT
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on athletic attainment in the short-term or long-term. That
is, it is not known whether REBT enhances skill execution
or kinematic aspects of sport performance, or aspects that
allow long-term goals to be attained (e.g., motivation, emotion
regulation). Anecdotally practitioners have reported observing
gains in the performance of the athletes they have applied REBT
with (Bernard, 1985; Marlow, 2009; Turner and Barker, 2014;
Turner et al., 2014), but this does not constitute objective or
even empirical evidence for the performance facilitating effects
of REBT or rational beliefs.
Because of the dearth of REBT research in sport, it is necessary
to look to research that assesses irrational beliefs, REBT, and
performance in other domains. In the meta-analysis by Gonzalez
et al. (2004), REBT was shown to have a moderate positive effect
on adolescent academic (Grade Point Average) performance
(mean Zr score of 0.49). The research included in the meta-
analysis that used GPA as a performance marker have the
advantage of including an objective indication of performance.
However, it is not possible to pinpoint what it was about
the REBT delivered that increased performance. Some research
suggests that irrational beliefs are inversely related to reading
ability, with speculation that rational beliefs may be related to
verbal intelligence (Prola, 1988). It could also be argued that
positive changes in behaviors, such class cutting (Block, 1978) and
increased effort (Kachman and Mazer, 1990), could contribute to
GPA, but there are a myriad of extraneous factors that contribute
to assessment performance for school students. Therefore it is
difficult from the above research to extract translatable findings to
sport, as the mechanisms between reductions in irrational beliefs
and performance were not investigated.
Research that more directly assess performance in relation
to irrational and rational beliefs adopts laboratory experimental
approaches. For example, participants on approach to a mirror-
tracing task given irrational self-talk statements (e.g., “If I don’t
perform perfectly well next time it will prove I’m stupid,”)
recorded the most errors in the task, and performed slower
than the rational self-talk group (e.g., “Mistakes don’t mean
I’m stupid”; Schill et al., 1978, p. 4). The irrational self-talk
group evidenced the worst performance efficiency in the task.
In a similar study of mirror tracing performance (Bonadies
and Bass, 1984) it was found that participants given rational
self-talk statements were significantly more accurate than those
given irrational self-talk statements, and a control group. The
irrational self-talk group and control group were as inaccurate
as each other, suggesting that rational self-talk is beneficial for
performance, rather than irrational self-talk being damaging
for performance. From these laboratory studies, it could be
suggested that movement efficiency in laboratory-based tasks
can be harmed by adopting irrational self-talk. However, self-
talk is considered to be effective for cognitive control but is not
necessarily reflective of deeply held beliefs (Bunker et al., 1993).
With the meta-analysis (Gonzalez et al., 2004) and the
laboratory studies (Schill et al., 1978; Bonadies and Bass, 1984)
considered, there is little research evidence that irrational beliefs
could harm athletic performance. The notion that REBT can
help athletic performance comes from anecdotal and case-study
sources, supported by REBT theory and research purporting
that rational beliefs lead to functional and adaptive emotions
and behaviors that facilitate goal attainment. Viewed through a
humanistic and hedonic lens, it could be argued that athletes
who feel better will perform better. For example, mood states are
able to predict athletic performance, whereby athletes with lower
depression, anger, and tension are more likely to perform well
(e.g., Beedie et al., 2000). In addition, recent work in the field
of REBT (Dryden, 2007; Neenan, 2009) and resilience (Fletcher
and Sarkar, 2013) intimates that there exists some symmetry
between REBT and the concept of resilience that may help to
better understand and develop resilience.
Resilience can be considered to be a process of adapting well
in the face of adversity, recognizing that emotional distress is very
much a part of becoming resilient (see Sarkar et al., 2015), and
that coming back from adversity is not necessarily an immediate
occurrence (American Psychological Association, 2004; Dryden,
2007). There is a need in sport for techniques that promote
resilience, particularly those that include the minimization of
catastrophic thinking, the challenging of counterproductive
beliefs, and the encouragement of cognitive restructuring
(Fletcher and Sarkar, 2012). The minimization of catastrophic
thinking and the challenging of counterproductive beliefs are
both central to the aims and process of REBT, with cognitive
restructuring particularly important for the endorsement of
rational beliefs over irrational beliefs. Indeed, the capacity for
rational beliefs to promote resilience has been met with the
formulation of an Athlete Rational Resilience Credo (Turner,
in press), which encourages successful adaptation to adversity
in athletes, and based on the work of Dryden (2007 p. 219),
presents “a set of beliefs, which expresses a particular opinion and
influences the way you live.” The links between irrational and
rational beliefs and resilience, and the use of REBT to promote
resilience, are yet to be fully explored but offer potentially fruitful
areas of future research that could help to elucidate the links
between irrational and rational beliefs, and sport performance.
The Potential Facilitating Effects of Irrational Beliefs
Despite the notion that irrational beliefs are harmful for
performance, many athletes and coaches the author works with
are adamant that irrational beliefs can help athletic performance,
such that they are reluctant to shed their irrational beliefs
for rational beliefs. To be candid, there is no hard evidence
suggesting that irrational beliefs harm athletic performance,
and of course there is insufficient evidence supporting the
opposite notion that irrational beliefs help athletic performance.
In the Schill et al. (1978) study, some individuals allocated
to the irrational self-talk group did perform well, in contrast
to the overall findings, a finding that should not be ignored.
Indeed, there may be a self-reinforcing thrill achieved when
people think irrationally, and distortion and exaggeration can
be exciting and may elicit the attention or sympathy of others
(Digiuseppe et al., 2014). Thus it may be that people experience
short-term advantages by thinking irrationally. Once one thinks
oneself to be worthless, one is legitimized to not put effort into
achieving ones goals (Backx, 2012). In the absence of more
evidence relating irrational beliefs to performance, it is perhaps
understandable why coaches and athletes are vigilant when it
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comes to challenging their own and their athletes’ beliefs. While
the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that irrational beliefs
are deleterious to mental health, it cannot be discounted that
irrational beliefs may be acutely helpful for motor performance.
Perhaps a ‘must win’ belief provides an extra impetus to exert
more effort on a given task, or provides a focus on what is to be
done to get the edge over an opponent within a competition, for
example. Indeed, some athletes adopt negative self-talk as a useful
strategy for performance as it may contain motivating properties
(Goodhart, 1986). It might be helpful to draw on motivation
theory to understand this apparent paradox, such as the self-
determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 1991; Ryan and Deci,
2000, 2002).
In self-determination theory individuals are considered
to be intentional organisms motivated to achieve differing
objectives. Hence, Deci and Ryan (1985) posited three types
of motivation that capture the different reasons for individual
engagement in achievement situations; intrinsic motivation,
extrinsic motivation, and amotivation. Intrinsic motivation,
various extrinsic motivations (external regulation, introjected
regulation, and identified regulation), and amotivation reflect
a self-determination continuum. Excellent papers can be read
on the intricacies of the self-determination continuum (e.g.,
Standage et al., 2005), however, for the purposes of the
current article, it is sufficient to understand that intrinsic
motivation refers to engagement in an activity for its own sake
(pleasure, interest, and satisfaction from activity itself), and as
an individual’s motives approach extrinsic motivation on the
continuum, the more that engagement in the activity is directed
by separable outcomes such as rewards or punishments.
Of particular interest due to its potential relationships
with irrational beliefs, is introjected regulation, which reflects
moderately low self-regulation. Introjected regulation is
characterized by an individual internalizing external regulations
(Ryan and Deci, 2002), where the direction for action is
controlled by self-imposed sanctions such as to avoid shame
and guilt, or attain ego enhancement such as pride. That is,
introjected regulation represents regulation by contingent
self-esteem (Deci and Ryan, 1995, 2000). Standage et al. (2005
p. 413) give an example that resonates with REBT, stating that
“an example of introjected regulation would be a student that
participates in an after school physical activity program, not
because she/he wants to, but because the student feels that she/he
should, because that is what ‘good students’ do.” This reflects
both demandingness beliefs (“should”) and global evaluations
(“good students”). Indeed, the perception that one should or
ought to engage in an activity is considered a hallmark of
introjected regulation (e.g., Gillison et al., 2009).
The potential relationship between irrational beliefs and
introjected regulation is important because it may begin to
elucidate how irrational beliefs could have both positive and
negative effects on athletic performance. Introjected regulation
is an external regulation, and as people internalize regulations
and assimilate them to the self, they experience greater autonomy
in action (Deci and Ryan, 2000). More autonomous extrinsic
motivation has been associated with more engagement (Connell
and Wellborn, 1991), better performance (Miserandino, 1996),
lower dropout (Vallerand and Bissonnette, 1992), higher quality
learning (Grolnick and Ryan, 1987), and better teacher ratings
(Hayamizu, 1997), among other outcomes (see Deci and Ryan,
2000, for a review). In one study conducted with students
(Ryan and Connell, 1989), higher external regulation was
associated with less interest, less value, and less effort toward
achievement, and higher tendencies to disown responsibility
for negative outcomes. Specifically, introjected regulation was
positively related to expending more effort, but it was also related
to feeling more anxiety and coping more poorly with failures.
Therefore, irrational beliefs reflecting introjected regulation may
inspire effort due to internal pressure (“I have to”), but may have
implications that undermine performance in the longer-term.
Echoing the above, Harrington (2005b) suggests that in
some circumstances irrational beliefs about high standards may
increase functional behavior, however, he also recognizes that
this may lead to psychological problems in other areas due to
increased workload and stress. So although irrational beliefs
may inspire effort, there are numerous risk factors that could
emerge as a result. Are we as practitioners comfortable with the
idea that athletes and coaches may promote irrational beliefs
for short-term performance, when we know that long-term
mental health may be compromised? There is enough evidence
that links irrational beliefs to harmful emotional and behavioral
consequences to drive those involved in sport to endeavor to
reduce irrational beliefs in athletes, and find alternate methods
of motivating optimal performance.
Double-Think
Perhaps irrational performance beliefs are more complex than
being either rational or irrational. Some athletes the author has
worked with are capable of using irrational thoughts for acute
performance situations, while harboring robust rational beliefs
as part of their philosophy of success and failure. Self-talk in
the moment does not necessarily reflect core beliefs. In other
words, it is possible for athletes to partake in what George Orwell
called “double think” in his book 1984, which is described as
“. . .the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind
simultaneously, and accepting both of them.” (Orwell, 1949,
p. 32). Orwell goes on to describe doublethink in the following
way:
“To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to
forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then when it
becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just
so long as it is needed. . ..” (Orwell, 1949, p. 32).
Holding contradictory ideas, such as irrational and rational
beliefs, is also akin to the concept of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957), which may result in discomfort due to
simultaneous endorsement of two contradicting beliefs.
Supposedly, people are motivated to reduce this dissonance, and
therefore holding both irrational and rational beliefs about the
same situation may be difficult (Festinger, 1957). For example,
a marathon runner in the final mile may use the self-talk “I
want to get my personal best and therefore I have to, and it
would be awful if I did not” which may inspire a final burst
of enthusiasm toward the home straight. However, the runner
may harbor a core belief that recognizes that “I want to get
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my personal best, but that does not mean I have to, and it
would be bad but not awful if I did not” that directly opposes
the self-talk, but this core belief is not useful or salient in that
context. When there is dissonance such as the above example
an individual can conveniently ignore the contradiction because
in the moment the irrational self-talk is achieving the desired
results of increased performance. For example, a smoker knows
that smoking is deadly, but can justify smoking because it feels
good and helps them to relax in the moment. So to reduce the
dissonance between irrational and rational beliefs, athletes can
view irrational self-talk as helpful in the moment, thus reducing
the conflict between the contradictions. Novak Djokovic,
professional tennis player with 12 Grand Slam singles titles (at
the time of writing), gives a nice example of this, where he says
that “Tennis is my life, obviously; I need to focus, I need to win.
But it’s not the only thing. I’m not going to play forever” (Wilbon,
2012). Here, Djokovic expresses the rigid and extreme need to
succeed, but also expresses a flexible and non-extreme belief
that tennis is not the only thing. This ability to use irrational
self-talk while holding rational core beliefs relies on the athletes
meta-cognitive ability to introspect on their thought processes
(Metcalfe and Shimamura, 1994), and be able to understand
that different beliefs are appropriate for different circumstances.
Athletes unable to relinquish their irrational self-talk when
they step off the court may find it difficult to endorse rational
beliefs, and therefore may be at risk from the many mental health
outcomes highlighted in this article.
Critical Summary
The question of whether irrational beliefs influence athletic
performance or not, is a complex but valuable one, for which
little research exists. There are reasons to believe that irrational
beliefs could actually help performance particularly in the short-
term if athletes are able to recognize the differences between
their self-talk and their core beliefs, but that long-term sport
performance is unlikely to benefit from holding irrational beliefs
in part due to the deleterious implications on mental health. If
irrational beliefs are in some way helpful in the short-term, or can
facilitate acute skilled performance, we must ponder the potential
costs of such beliefs long-term. Enough evidence exists regarding
mental health that should dissuade the promotion of irrational
beliefs. Thus even if irrational beliefs can in some situations help
performance, it is questionable whether irrational beliefs should
ever be encouraged. These conjectures are based on anecdotal
evidence, theory and inferences made from, at times, disparate
research, and it has to be stressed that little data currently exists
that could empirically support, or refute, these conjectures. It
is hoped that the ideas above promote further investigation by
researchers and practitioners.
The Origins and Development of
Irrational and Rational Beliefs in Athletes
The current review has presented evidence that attests to strong
links between irrational beliefs and poorer mental health. It
is argued that the links between irrational and rational beliefs
and mental health outcomes exist because of the associated
functional (healthy) and dysfunctional (unhealthy) emotional
and behavioral consequences that are driven by the beliefs.
Because irrational beliefs lead to a range of UNEs that undermine
mental health, it is important to understand how irrational
beliefs are developed and propagated, so that interventions and
strategies can be developed to dissuade the development of
irrational beliefs, and promote rational beliefs, before formal
REBT is required.
Nature vs. Nurture
Like many psychological constructs, there is a debate as to
whether irrational beliefs are driven by nature (we are born
irrational) or by nurture (we learn irrationality). Ellis (1976)
intimated, and Ruth (1992) propagated, that there is a biological
basis or innate tendency for rational and irrational beliefs, such
that it is in our nature to develop both rational and irrational
beliefs. Ellis wrote, “humans have a strong tendency to needlessly
and severely disturb themselves, and that, to make matters much
worse, they also are powerfully predisposed to unconsciously
and habitually prolong their mental dysfunctioning and to fight
like hell against giving it up” (Ellis, 1987, p. 365). Ellis (1987)
suggests that humans are predisposed to develop such beliefs,
thus explaining why they are difficult to change, and why they
persist despite cultural teachings and self-awareness. Ellis’ core
argument was that all humans at some point believe, think, and
act in ways that are self-destructive, reflecting the illogicality of
holding such beliefs, thoughts, and behaviors (Sharf, 1996). This
is evident across all known social and cultural groups. He argues
that all societal and cultural institutions promote demandingness,
awfulizing, low-frustration tolerance, and depreciation to greater
or lesser extents.
Ellis recognizes that societal and cultural irrationalities are
driven by the teachings of significant others, and makes the
point that we ourselves have a propensity to willingly receive
and internalize these irrationalities and continue to perpetuate
them for the rest of our lives. Irrational beliefs are exacerbated
by those around us whom we look to for guidance on how to
live our lives (Sharf, 1996), but irrational beliefs are so ubiquitous
that they cannot possibly be entirely learned. Indeed, even when
society dissuades certain self-destructive behaviors, humans are
resistant to rationality and constantly think and act in ways that
are contrary to self-propagation and the development of the
human race. We give up many erroneous beliefs as we develop
and mature, but irrational beliefs maintain.
In sum, Ellis and others suggest that we are predisposed
to irrational beliefs, but that society has a part to play in
teaching us these beliefs. Depending on these biological and social
factors, individuals can vary in their vulnerability to psychological
disturbance (Sharf, 1996). Ultimately, society drives irrationality,
and we as humans develop irrational beliefs as a function of our
biological tendency to do so. So assuming that athletes are normal
human beings (which of course they are), we have to look to
the culture of sport to start to explain sport-related irrational
beliefs in athletes (the irrational beliefs of the vast number of
individuals involved in sport who are not athletes will be ignored
for the purposes of this paper). It is difficult to understand or
estimate the prevalence of irrational beliefs in athletes due to
the dearth in relevant literature. Typically, prevalence research
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randomly selects a sample from the population in question (e.g.,
athletes) and provides an estimation of the problem for the
population (Boyle, 1998). This approach has not been taken so
far within the REBT literature concerning sport. As previously
reviewed, most of the extant literature is applied in nature
and is more concerned with measuring the effects of REBT
on small numbers of athletes. However, there is a need to
understand the extent to which athletes hold irrational and
rational beliefs, and whether this differs from more prominently
studied populations (e.g., students, clinical samples). At present,
it is not known whether athletes are more or less likely to
endorse irrational and rational beliefs compared to non-athlete
populations. Therefore, it is very difficult to grasp the extent of
the problem.
The Language of Sport
Although data do not exist that reveal the prevalence of irrational
and rational beliefs in athletes, when sport is viewed through the
lens of the media, irrational beliefs are evident in the language
used in the daily sporting narrative. The way that sport is
portrayed in the media would have us believe that the very
nature of sport is irrational, with barely a week going by without
irrational language being used to inappropriately describe the on
and off field exploits of athletes and coaches. To use a recent
example, Louis van Gaal (Manchester United Football Club
manger) was asked prior to the 2015 Boxing Day match against
Stoke City Football Club if it is a “must-win” and van Gaal said
“Yes, I think so because when you have lost three times in a row
to you need to win.” He said “We have to focus on that match and
we have to win that match.” Manchester United lost that match 2–
0, which apparently was a “must-win” (Sheen, 2015). In contrast,
Jurgen Klopp often uses more rational language, and after failing
to win in his first three matches in charge of Liverpool Football
Club, he said:
“This is not the end of the world. We conceded a goal near
the end, and it felt like the end of the world, but it is not the
end of the world. . .I hope I’m not the only person in the stadium
who thought: ‘This is not the end of the world.’ We can work
on this. . .Of course, it is not the best moment for us, because
we wasted a lot of energy. Southampton haven’t lost away from
home, so we had to work hard. . .You score the goal and you
want to win, but it didn’t happen for us today. Football is not a
fairytale. Sometimes we can write stories like this but it doesn’t
always happen” (Agence France-Presse, 2015).
Therefore, if the prevalence of irrational and rational beliefs
can in some part be reflected in the utterances of athletes and
coaches, then a deeper analysis of this phenomenon is warranted.
Of course, what athletes and coaches say to the media is not
necessarily indicative of deeply held core beliefs, and caution
should always be paid to the interpretation of media sound
bites. But it is recognized that common cultural stereotypes in
our language, our stories, our songs, play a part in developing
rational and irrational beliefs (Digiuseppe et al., 2014). It could
be argued that sport is especially endorsing of irrationality,
where irrationality is openly propagated and often boasted about.
Indeed, the irrational notion of “terrible performances” and
“must win games” is common parlance in many sports, and even
used as a badge of honor to demonstrate how much an individual
cares about their performance. The language used to report sport
may play a role in not only reflecting irrational beliefs, but may
also play a role in developing irrational beliefs.
Athletes, just like any other human being, populate a complex
social world. To navigate this social world of coaches, teammates,
support staff, opponents, supporters (and non-supporters),
the media, and of course friends and family, the reciprocal
communication of information is important. An athlete takes
instruction, advice, guidance, opinions, and criticism on a daily
basis, but also may deliver similar information to others on a
typical day. This is important because it suggests that people
are influenced by language used in communication with others
and oneself, and therefore when imprecise language is used (such
as the verbal expression of rigid, extreme, and illogical beliefs)
this can augment imprecise thinking (Dryden, 2015). This is
in line with General Semantics Theory (Korzybski, 1933), and
suggests that the language used to communicate with athletes
is a powerful source of information guiding thought processes
and subsequent emotional and behavioral responding. Therefore,
even if key stakeholders of an athlete’s mental health do not really
believe the irrational beliefs they portray in their use of language,
the communication of such information contributes to the beliefs
of athletes.
The examination of language within sport settings may be
a fruitful area for future research, partly because it offers the
advantages of representing rigid irrational beliefs in the symbolic
form of language where the belief is more easily examined
and manipulated (Dryden, 2015) compared to deeper level
beliefs (e.g., schemas; David et al., 2002). If irrational beliefs
are developed through cultural learning, key stakeholders in the
development of team and organizational cultures that surround
athletes should be investigated. This investigation should focus
on the language used by coaches, managers, support staff, parents,
and athletes, in training and performance settings, and whether
this language contains content symbolic of irrational beliefs. Also,
shifts in athlete beliefs during and after the manipulation of
this language should be explored to understand the impact of
irrational and rational language on beliefs. That is, controlled
experimental and field studies should be undertaken that directly
manipulate rational and irrational language to understand the
extent to which this language triggers the development of rational
and irrational beliefs, and associated emotional and behavioral
maladaptation.
Critical Summary
If it is apparent through empirical research that athlete irrational
beliefs are driven by socialization, then it is possible to
start to combat irrational beliefs in athletes by equipping
key stakeholders with information and education concerning
the dissuasion of irrational language, and the promotion of
rational language. This may involve systematically engaging with
coaches, parents, support staff, and performance directors, to
help challenge the cascade of irrational language that athletes
are exposed to all too frequently. Of course, the most direct way
to challenge irrational beliefs in athletes to work directly with
those athletes. However, cultural changes within organizations
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can have a more long-lasting and broader effect (Katzenbach
et al., 2012) on a larger number of athletes that may go some
way to reducing the need for individual REBT with athletes. If we
are to meaningfully reduce the development of irrational beliefs
in athletes, we must first understand how they emerge and what
factors drive their development. Then targeted interventions can
be formulated and applied within sporting organizations with
athletes and key stakeholders in athlete mental health.
KEY QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE REBT
RESEARCH IN SPORT
In this section, the themes highlighted throughout this article
are brought forward and key questions for future research are
proposed. These questions should guide the future investigation
of REBT in sport to enable stronger conclusions to be drawn
about the value of REBT theory and practice as applied to the
mental health and performance of athletes. The key questions
reflect what is currently known about irrational beliefs and REBT
from research outside of sport, and bring forth the most salient
areas for future research in sport.
Do Irrational Beliefs and Rational Beliefs
Influence the Mental Health of Athletes?
The extant research demonstrates that, in non-clinical and
clinical populations, irrational beliefs are positively related to
mental illness (and symptoms of mental ill health), whereas
rational beliefs are positively related to mental health. However,
it is not yet known whether these well-supported assertions
hold true in sport settings, in athletes. This is surely the chief
research question to emerge from this article and should be
of paramount concern to researchers investigating REBT in
sport. Researchers should also begin to investigate whether
the four core irrational beliefs separately predict sporting
emotions and behaviors in training and competitive contexts. For
example, an understanding of irrational beliefs, and particularly
awfulizing (catastrophizing) in athletes may help to manage pain
more effectively through rehabilitation programs. In particular,
longitudinal research is needed to understand to what extent
irrational and rational beliefs predict changes in mental health
outcomes in the long-term. There is a huge array of mental health
outcomes that could be assessed, and research should focus on
objective markers such as physiological reactivity and behavioral
indicators (e.g., injury, physical illness). Also, moving beyond
correlational research, future studies should seek to distinguish
between athletes with lesser and greater mental health, and apply
REBT to specifically address mental health outcomes.
Do Irrational Beliefs and Rational Beliefs
Influence Athletic Performance?
Current knowledge about the relationship between irrational
and rational beliefs and athletic performance stems from
disparate research, anecdotal reflections, and self-reported athlete
perceptions. The current review debates a potentially complex
picture of how irrational beliefs may relate to performance that
has the potential to generate many future research studies. For
example, can irrational beliefs be beneficial for performance
in the short-term compared to the long-term? Also, can
athletes engage in cognitive dissonance that allows them to
utilize irrational beliefs for acute performance purposes, but
endorsing rational beliefs as a more general life philosophy?
Further, the motivational properties of irrational and rational
beliefs for sport performance need to be better understood.
The present review offers some theoretically plausible ideas
that marry self-determination theory constructs with irrational
beliefs, but research should examine these using meditational and
longitudinal methods to understand how irrational beliefs predict
changes in motivation regulation. Also, the notion of resilience in
sport is becoming an important construct in research, and REBT
addresses some of the main recommendations for resilience
training. Therefore, research exploring the use of REBT to
enhance the resilience of athletes should be undertaken, with a
view to understanding the contribution of REBT to long-term
athletic achievement.
How Are Irrational Beliefs Developed in
Athletes?
This article suggests that the development of irrational beliefs
in athletes is likely to be driven by athlete socialization into
competitive environments, while as human beings athletes have
an innate tendency to develop irrational and rational beliefs. In
fact, it is argued in this review that sport is especially promoting of
irrational beliefs especially through language, and therefore, the
culture of sport, both from an individual sports organization and
a broad athletic community perspective, should be investigated.
Therefore primarily researchers should conduct investigations
that first seek to confirm the nature of irrational beliefs (e.g.,
are irrational and rational beliefs schemas?), and then seek to
understand how irrational beliefs are developed. This research
needs to occur in the general population as well as within
sport samples, as there may be differences in how irrational
and rational beliefs are perpetuated in sport compared to other
endeavors (performance and non-performance). Understanding
how irrational beliefs are developed in athletes will guide the
psychosocial development of athletes, and inform the application
of REBT in sport to address mental health outcomes throughout
an athlete’s career. This important question may be aided by
researchers and practitioners with expertise in developmental
psychology, and the more general formation of beliefs, and
therefore would no doubt be a fruitful area for multidisciplinary
research.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to present three keys areas
that would allow further understanding of irrational beliefs and
REBT within sport with a particular focus on mental health.
Due to REBT’s focus on mental health, this article examined the
evidence linking irrational and rational beliefs with mental health
outcomes. As part of this examination, athletic performance,
emotional responding, and the development of irrational beliefs,
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were considered. REBT is proposed as an important framework
for use with athletes. Through understanding the links between
irrational and rational beliefs, and mental health, this article
offered a number of research questions that should be
addressed by researchers. In addition, the application of
REBT should be promoted to neophyte practitioners, and
the applied work of practitioners using REBT should be
more frequently reported in primary research and case-study
outlets, so that a shared understanding of how REBT can
be applied in sport is garnered. Overall, it is hoped that
this article fuels the interests of researchers, students, and
practitioners, so that the value of REBT for the promotion
of mental heath in sport is recognized and endorsed more
widely.
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